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ADMINISTRATIVE COMMENT
EUTHANASIA IN MARYLAND: THE RIGHT TO
DIE WITH DIGNITY?
I. INTRODUCTION
The State of Maryland, generally known for conservative health law legis-
lation, recently has interpreted its laws governing medical care of the termi-
nally ill and permanently unconscious in a manner that places it among the
most liberal states in the area of medical treatment decisionmaking. On Oc-
tober 17, 1988, the Maryland Attorney General's office released an analysis
of the effect of the Maryland "Living Will"' and substituted judgment laws2
upon the administering of artificial sustenance ("AAS"), i.e., tubal or intra-
venous feeding of nutrition and hydration,3 to terminally ill and perma-
nently unconscious patients.4 The Attorney General's opinion is intended to
guide terminally ill patients, and surrogate decisionmakers of terminally ill
and permanently unconscious patients with respect to the legal implications
and requirements of a decision to withhold artificial sustenance.
1. MD. HEALTH-GEN CODE ANN. §§ 5-601-614 (1987).
2. See MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 13-601 (1973), which allows a person to exe-
cute a document naming an attorney-in-fact to make substituted decisions in the event the
grantor becomes incapable of making legally binding decisions. See also 73 Op. Att'y Gen. 88-
046 (Oct. 17, 1988) [hereinafter Att'y Gen. Op.] where the Maryland Attorney general inter-
preted MD. HEALTH-GEN CODE ANN. § 20-107(d) (1987) as implicitly granting one the right
to use a durable power of attorney for medical treatment decisions in the event he becomes
incapacitated.
3. Both the Maryland laws discussed herein and the Attorney General's opinion pertain
to patients who require artificially administered sustenance (hereinafter AAS) for physical or
psychological reasons. The pertinent artificial sustenance includes "enteral" (i.e., tubal) and
"parenteral" (i.e., intravenous) feeding. See Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 6 (citing THE
HASTINGS CENTER, Guidelines On The Termination Of Life-Sustaining Treatment And The
Care Of The Dying, 140 (1987)) [hereinafter HASTINGS CENTER GUIDELINES]. These statutes
also govern the withholding of other types of medical procedures, such as orders to withhold
cardio pulmonary resuscitation from a patient. See also MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-
601(e) (1987) (governing do not resuscitate orders) [hereinafter DNR orders]; MD. HEALTH-
GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-107 (1987) (DNR orders can be requested by a family member on
behalf of a patient in the same manner that an AAS withholding or withdrawing request is
made). For a general discussion of do not resuscitate orders, see Legislative Comment, Do Not
Resuscitate Orders: A Matter of Life and Death In New York, 4 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 449 (1988).
4. Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 1.
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This Comment begins with a summary of the Maryland Attorney Gen-
eral's opinion. Next, the Comment analyzes the Attorney General's opinion
in terms of its impact upon euthanasic decisionmaking5 and addresses inher-
ent quandaries in the Maryland statutory and common law and the Attorney
General's interpretation of the law. Finally, the Comment concludes that
there are procedural safeguards which may need to be implemented to pro-
tect both terminally ill and permanently unconscious patients in Maryland
from abusive medical treatment decisionmaking.
II. SUMMARY OF THE MARYLAND ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OPINION
As of February 1, 1987, two states had enacted "Living Will" laws,6 and
ten states had enacted both "Living Will" and Durable Power of Attorney
laws.7 In 1987, Maryland joined these twelve states by adding a "Living
Will" law to its existing Durable Power of Attorney law. Thereafter, the
Maryland Office on Aging requested a clarification of these two laws as they
relate to AAS refusal decisions. The result was the Attorney General's Oc-
tober 17, 1988 opinion, which was directed at clarifying the legal ambiguities
surrounding euthanasic decisionmaking by or on behalf of all patient groups
in Maryland.'
The specific Maryland statutory and common law analyzed by the Attor-
ney General govern euthanasic decisionmaking by or on behalf of three types
of patients: 1) the terminally ill patient who is conscious and competent to
make medical treatment decisions; 2) the terminally ill patient who is con-
scious but incapable of making legally competent medical treatment deci-
sions; and 3) the permanently unconscious patient.9 The Attorney General
5. Euthanasia is defined as "[t]he act or practice of painlessly putting to death persons
suffering from incurable and distressing disease as an act of mercy." BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 497 (5th ed. 1979).
6. See ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to 10 (1987 & Supp. 1988); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.540-
.690 (1987).
7. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY §§ 7185-7195 (Deering Supp. 1988); CAL. CIV.
§§ 2412.5, 2430-44 (Deering 1985 & Supp. 1989); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501-4509 (1985 &
Supp. 1988); IDAHO CODE §§ 15-5-501 to -507 (1985 & Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-
28, 101 (1983 & Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-6 10-617 (1983 & Supp. 1988); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 41-41-101 to -121 (Supp. 1988); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 87-3-13, 87-3-15 (1972 &
Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-1 to -10 (1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-5-501 to -502
(1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320-323 (1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-8 to -14 (1985); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 97.050-.090 (Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 126.407 (Supp. 1987); TEX. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 4590h (Vernons 1982 & Supp. 1988); TEX. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36A (Vernons
1980); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981-2982 (1988); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-9.1-.2 (1985 & Supp
1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010 to .100, .900, .905 (West Supp. 1989); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 11.94.010 to .020 (1987).
8. Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2.
9. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-601(g) (1987) defines a terminal condition as "an
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concludes that all three types of patients have a right to forgo artificial suste-
nance. The Attorney General asserts that this right is grounded in both the
United States and Maryland Constitutions, as well as Maryland common
law.10
No formalities are required for one to make an advanced decision to direct
the withholding or withdrawing of certain medical treatment in the event he
becomes disabled.1' To ensure that such a prior decision is honored, one
may express his desire to forgo AAS in a living will, 2 or a "medical" dura-
incurable condition caused by injury, disease, or illness, which to a reasonable degree of medi-
cal certainty makes death imminent, and from which, despite the application of life-sustaining
procedures, there may be no recovery."
In defining "imminent," the Maryland General Assembly warned against statutory line
drawing and noted that "inevitable" and "imminent" death can only be determined on a case-
by-case basis. For guidance, the Attorney General cites neighboring jurisdictions' definitions
of imminent death. See Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 7-8 (citing State Dep't of Human Serv.
v. Northern, 563 S.W.2d 197 (Tenn. App. 1978) (imminent refers to closeness in point of time,
and that closeness is a term of many degrees, requiring one to look at each individual case, and
the surrounding circumstances); Hazelton v. Powhatan Nursing Home, Inc., 6 Va. Cir. 414,
417 (1986) (imminent death is not limited to death likely to occur within a few hours, but may
include a condition likely to lead to death within a few months)).
Maryland law defines "permanently unconscious" as a condition where "all possible compo-
nents of mental life, . . . including thought, feeling, sensation, desire, emotion and awareness of
self or environment [are absent]." Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 8 (citing PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL BE-
HAVIORAL RESEARCH, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment 174, 174-75 (1983))
[hereinafter President's Commission Report]. Under this definition, "only vegetative functions
and reflexes persist." President's Commission Report at 174-75. Consequently, the patient is
"alive only in that their basic metabolic functions continue." Id. "Permanent unconscious-
ness," as used in the attorney general's opinion, however, is not the "'irreversible cessation of
all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem,'" which is the definition for death
under MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-202(a)(2) (1987). Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at
9 n.6.
The Maryland laws regulating substituted judgment do not allow artificial sustenance deci-
sions to be made on behalf of nonterminal, conscious patients who are legally incompetent to
make medical treatment decisions due to disease or conditions such as mental retardation or
emotional handicaps. Furthermore, the laws do not cover the ending of life-sustaining treat-
ment for infants. Id. at 4.
10. Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 9-19. The Constitutional guarantee stems from U.S.
Constitution's "penumbra" based right to privacy which applies to all States via the fourteenth
amendment. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. Although the first amendment does not
expressly provide for a privacy right, many Supreme Court decisions have held that the first
amendment does implicitly guarantee such a right. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (holding that the "penumbra" privacy right flows from several amendments to the
United States Constitution, including the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth, which
protect ones right to use contraception); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a
woman may have the privacy right to abort a fetus, provided the state's interest in protecting
life does not outweigh the woman's right to privacy).
11. Att'y Gen. Op, supra note 2, at 24-25.
12. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-602(c) (1987) requires that if one uses a living
1989]
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ble power of attorney.13 According to the Attorney General, even if a pa-
tient has not documented the decision to forgo AAS, he still retains the
constitutional and common law right to self determination in the event he
becomes terminally ill or permanently unconscious. Under Maryland law, if
a patient is terminally ill and is disabled' 4 (i.e., legally unable to make treat-
ment decisions), then a surrogate (court appointed or determined by statute)
may be empowered to make an AAS refusal decision on the patient's be-
half.'5 Similarly, the decision to withhold or end AAS for a permanently
unconscious patient, even if he is not terminally ill, may also be made by a
surrogate. 16
In general, all surrogate decisions to withhold or withdraw AAS made on
behalf of permanently unconscious patients require court approval. 17 Deci-
sions by or on behalf of terminally ill patients, however, are subject to a
different analysis. Maryland law does not require a competent, terminally ill
patient to seek court approval before he can refuse AAS.' 8 Court approval
is usually required when the decision to withhold or withdraw AAS is made
by a surrogate of a terminally ill, disabled patient. The legal status of the
surrogate and the factual context in which the decision is made are analyzed
to determine if the court must be petitioned.' 9
For example, under Maryland law legal guardians have superior decision-
making power over all other surrogates, including family members of the
will to direct the refusal of AAS, he must specifically reference his wish to forgo artificially
administered sustenance such as nutrition and hydration, to legally ensure that such treatment
will not be administered if he eventually becomes incompetent to make his own medical treat-
ment decisions.
13. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 13-601 (1974) allows one to execute a legal instru-
ment to authorize a designated individual to act on his behalf in the event he becomes disabled.
According to the Attorney General, MD. HEALTH-GEN CODE ANN. § 20-107(d) (1987) spe-
cifically refers to the use of a durable power of attorney relating to medical care, implying that
the instrument may be used for medical treatment decisions. Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at
23.
14. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-107(a)(2) (1987) states that a patient is a "dis-
abled individual.., when... [he] lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or commu-
nicate a responsible decision on health care . . . because of: (i) A physical disability; (ii)
Chronic alcoholism; (iii) Drug addiction; (iv) A disease; or (v) A mental disability, including
senility."
15. Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 3, 15-17.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 31, 38 (discussing decisions by family members and decisions by guardians,
respectively). Under the Attorney General's analysis, it is unclear whether the analysis applied
to surrogate decisions made on behalf of nonterminal, permanently unconscious patients is
equally applicable to surrogate decisions made on behalf of terminal, permanently unconscious
patients.
18. Id. at 9-15.
19. Id.
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patient.2" Even with this legal status, court approval is still required before
the guardian's decision to withhold or withdraw AAS from a terminally ill,
disabled patient is honored. If a family member21 of a disabled, terminally
ill patient made the same decision, however, it would not require court ap-
proval, as long as all immediate family members, the physician, and the hos-
pital patient care advisory committee concurred with that decision.22
Alternatively, if family members are not available, absent a prior request by
the patient, a physician cannot make the decision to withhold AAS from a
terminal and disabled patient, without first receiving court approval.2 3 This
may be particulary difficult for Maryland nursing homes which are pre-
cluded from acting as a surrogate to either direct the administration or with-
holding of artificial sustenance from a terminally ill, or permanently
unconscious patient.24
Two standards guide all decisions by surrogates in Maryland to initiate or
withhold medical treatment from a patient. The first is known as the substi-
tuted judgment standard. Application of this standard requires the surro-
gate to base this decision upon his actual knowledge of prior statements or
actions by the disabled person which reasonably indicate his treatment phi-
losophies including the course of action that the patient would have chosen
under the same circumstances.25 Alternatively, where the surrogate does
not possess any reasonable indication as to the patient's wishes, the surrogate
may then substitute his judgment for that of the patient's pursuant to the
20. Id. at 4.
21. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-107(d) (1987) states that a patient's spouse has
priority over all other family members in the ability to make surrogate decisions on his or her
behalf. If the patient does not have a spouse, or the spouse is deemed legally incompetent to
make a treatment decision, then the surrogate decision making authority flows as follows (in
order of priority): 1) an adult child of the patient, 2) a parent 3) an adult sibling 4) a grandpar-
ent or 5) an adult grandchild. Id.
22. Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 37-38.
23. See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
24. If the disabled, terminally ill or permanently unconscious patient is a resident of a
nursing home, and a living will or medical power of attorney authorizes the nursing home to
withhold or withdraw AAS, then the patient's request must, in most cases, be honored. Att'y
Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 41-45. See MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 19-344 (1987). Like-
wise, a nursing home in Maryland may not discharge or transfer a patient based solely upon
the patient's or the surrogate's decision to refuse AAS. Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 43-45.
The fact that such a decision conflicts with the nursing home's policies is irrelevant. Id. A
Maryland hospital, however, may discharge or transfer a patient for such reasons, but only if
to do so would not impose an undue burden upon the patient. Id. The reasoning behind the
statutory distinction in Maryland between a nursing home and a hospital's ability to act in this
context is unclear, although high demand for nursing home space in Maryland (which could
lead to abusive behavior by the nursing homes) may be the determinative factor. See generally
infra note 96 and accompanying text.
25. Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 25.
1989]
302 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 5:297
patient's best interest.26 In making this judgment, the surrogate must weigh
several factors listed by the Attorney General, including "the relief of suffer-
ing, the preservation or restoration of functioning and the quality as well as
the extent of life sustained."
2 7
III. ANALYSIS
This section begins with a discussion of the scope of an individual's right
to self-determination in the State of Maryland. The discussion then focuses
on the legal standards for a surrogate's decision to withhold or withdraw
AAS for two types of patients: 1) the terminal, conscious, but incompetent
patient; and 2) the permanently unconscious patient. Lastly, this section
reviews the legal instruments available to Maryland residents which allow a
patient to direct the course of medical treatment in the event he becomes
legally disabled to make his own medical treatment decisions.
A. The Right to Die: Medical Choices
1. Rights of the Competent, Terminally Il Patient
The Maryland courts recognize and protect the right of each resident "to
safeguard the integrity of his or her own body." 28 This right to self-determi-
nation exists whether or not a formal document is executed. In theory, the
right to self-determination is not an absolute. An individual's decision to
refuse treatment may be limited by the State of Maryland's interests in: the
preservation of life, the prevention of suicide, the protection of interests of
innocent third parties, and the maintenance of ethical integrity of the medi-
26. Id.
27. President's Commission Report, supra note 9, at 135.
28. Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 9 (citing Mercy Hosp., Inc. v Jackson, 62 Md. App.
409, 418, 489 A.2d 1130, 1134 (1985), vacated as moot, 306 Md. 556, 510 A.2d 562 (1986)).
The attorney general notes that although the Jackson case, cited in support of the proposition
that each individual has the right "to safeguard the integrity of his or her own body," has been
vacated, it is cited only for the value of its reasoning. Id. at 9 n.6. See also HASTINGS CENTER
GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 7 (stating that the terminally ill patient under the doctrine of
self-determination has a "right... to determine the nature of his or her own medical care....
The Principle of autonomy is the moral basis for the legal doctrine of informed consent, which
includes the right of informed refusal."). The Maryland Attorney General also explains that
although the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to find that the U.S. Constitution guarantees the
right to deny medical treatment, Courts in Delaware, New Jersey, and Florida have based the
right of a competent individual-to refuse "life-sustaining" treatment upon the Constitution's
"penumbra" right to privacy. Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 11. Moreover, the Arizona
Supreme Court has held that the Arizona State Constitution expressly protects a person's right
to refuse treatment. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987) (cited in Att'y
Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 11). From these various state pronouncements, the Maryland At-
torney General concludes that in Maryland one has a constitutional right to privacy which
encompasses the right to refuse medical treatment. Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 9-15.
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cal profession.2 9 Yet, none of these four state interests has, to date, been
found to be of sufficient weight by the Maryland courts to override the right
of a competent, terminally ill patient to refuse life-sustaining treatment.
Moreover, the Attorney General's opinion gives short shrift to these state
interests. If the Attorney General's opinion reflects the prevailing view of
the Maryland courts, the trend in that State will be the continued judicial
support for decisions favoring euthanasia in most circumstances.3 °
Given this broad interpretation of the scope of the right to self determina-
tion, Maryland courts may at some point be called upon to resolve the inher-
ent conflict with the Attorney General's opinion and the State's prohibition
against aiding one in the exercise of suicide.3 The Attorney General fails to
adequately reconcile the conflict between legal self-determination 32 and pro-
hibited suicide. According to the Attorney General, euthanasia through the
withholding or withdrawing of artificial sustenance, as requested in a living
will, medical durable power of attorney, or informally to a physician, are
valid exercises of the common law right of self-determination.
33
The Attorney General cites the case of Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical
Hospital34 in support of the proposition that the refusal of AAS by a compe-
tent but terminally ill patient is not suicide. The Tune court held that such
refusal is not the termination of a healthy life by self-induced means, but is,
29. Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 12.
30. Both the rights of third parties and the maintenance of the integrity of the medical
profession are dealt with summarily by the Attorney General. He opines that no state interest
would be furthered by prohibiting the competent, terminally ill patient from refusing artifi-
cially administered sustenance. Id. at 12-15. As for the ethical integrity of the medical profes-
sion, the Attorney General explains that refusal of artificially administered sustenance is in
accordance with recognized medical views that "the dying are more often in need of comfort
then treatment." Id. at 14 (quoting Satz v. Perlmuller, 362 So. 2d 160, 163-64 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (1980)). He also reasoned that the "control of one's fate...
[is] superior to the institutional considerations" such as hospital policies. Id. (quoting Satz,
362 So. 2d at 164).
31. See O'Brien, Facilitating Euthanatic, Rational Suicide: Help Me Go Gentle Into That
Good Night, 31 ST. L. UNIV. L.J. 655 (1987) (reprinted in 10 SPECIALTY LAW DIGEST:
HEALTH CARE 7 (1989)) [hereinafter Facilitating Euthanatic Rational Suicide] stating that
"[i]n some states that do not specifically prohibit the assisting, soliciting or causing of a sui-
cide, the state may prosecute a suicide abettor under the common law." Maryland is cited as
one of these states.
32. The use of the term self-determination is arguably inappropriate in the context of
certain surrogate decisions. When a surrogate bases a medical decision upon what he believes
to be in the patient's best interest, or upon what he believes that the patient would want done,
without a prior writing or statement by the patient, then the decision is really that of the
surrogate, and not of the patient. Therefore, the patient is not exercising self-determination;
rather, the surrogate is exercising substituted judgment.
33. See Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 10-19, 24.
34. 602 F. Supp. 1452 (D.D.C. 1985).
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"nature... tak[ing] its course."" The Attorney General does not acknowl-
edge, however, that often it is the withholding of nutrition, and not the dis-
ease, that eventually terminates the patient's life.36 Therefore, the statement
that the withholding of nutrition for the terminally ill patient is simply "na-
ture running its course" is an insufficient basis for distinguishing between
self-determination and prohibited suicide.
In short, the reasoning of the Tune case, as adopted by the Attorney Gen-
eral, makes an illogical distinction between the withholding of food and
water from an unhealthy and a healthy individual. The withholding of nu-
trition will ultimately end both the healthy persons's life and, assuming the
terminal disease has not yet run its course, the life of the terminally ill pa-
tient as well. In the case of the former, however, the act of withholding
nutrition would be assisting in a suicide or the commission of a homicide. In
the latter case, the withdrawal of artificial sustenance from the terminally ill
patient would be a common law,,and now statutorily supported, exercise of
self-determination, regardless of whether the patient dies of dehydration
and/or starvation, rather than another cause. Detractors of the Attorney
General's position argue that the withdrawing of AAS from a terminally ill
patient is not merely "allowing nature to take its course," but, rather ap-
proaches "active misfeasance." 37
2. Rights of the Terminally Ill and Disabled or Permanently
Unconscious Patient
Maryland law defines the disabled patient as one who lacks the capacity to
make his own treatment decisions.3" A patient that is permanently uncon-
35. Id. at 1455 n.8.
36. See Facilitating Euthanatic, Rational Suicide, supra note 31, at 662-63:
Withholding nourishment severs the patient's life line and moves perilously close to
grazing the fine line separating misfeasance or 'active' misconduct, from nonfeasance,
'passive' inaction or an omission to act. Some commentators urge that the with-
drawal of artificial devices providing nourishment and hydration more nearly ap-
proximates active rather than passive euthanasia. The rationale for the distinction is
that the patient's death results from starvation and dehydration, not from the culmi-
nation of the natural course of the immobilizing disease.
(citing D. WALTON, ETHICS OF WITHDRAWAL OF LIFE-SUPPORT SYSTEMS 233-37 (1983);
Note, I. V Withdrawal: The Severance of Medicine's or Society's Umbilical Cord?, 63 NEB. L.
REV. 941, 956-57 (1984)).
37. Id.
38. MD HEALTH-GEN CODE ANN. § 20-107(a)(2) (1987). It is not enough that the pa-
tient disagrees with the doctors suggested treatment plan to label him "disabled." Therefore,
the patient is protected from the doctor's substituting his own judgement for that of the com-
petent patients. Id. (citing Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 440, 379 A.2d 1014, 1020 (1977),
holding that "[t]he law does not allow a physician to substitute his judgment for that of the
patient in the matter of consent to treatment.").
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scious is disabled by definition because he is incapable of making his own
treatment decisions. Once a patient is deemed to be disabled, decisionmak-
ing on his behalf may be conducted by court appointed legal guardians, fam-
ily members, or physicians.
The Attorney General cites the analysis of the New Jersey Supreme Court
in the case of In re Quinlan39 as the requisite starting point for all cases
involving a surrogate's decision to withhold or terminate AAS, including
decisions made on behalf of terminally ill, disabled patients. Quinlan in-
volved the well-publicized decision by a permanently unconscious patient's
father to remove his daughter's respiratory life support system. The New
Jersey Supreme Court upheld the right of the father in Quinlan to make
medical treatment decisions on behalf of his daughter. In Quinlan, the fa-
ther petitioned the court for approval to remove the life-support systems as
required under New Jersey law." The doctors who had examined the pa-
tient and the hospital ethics committee concurred that there was no reason-
able possibility that the patient would ever emerge from her comatose
condition to a cognitive state.4 In granting permission to remove the respi-
rator, the court held that the patient, if competent, would have had the con-
stitutional right in New Jersey to refuse medical treatment, even life-
sustaining treatment.42 Accordingly, because the patient was not compe-
tent, the court allowed the patient's father to make the decision on her be-
half. The court explained that the unconscious patient's right to terminate a
"noncognitive, vegetative existence ... by natural forces ... [which is] re-
garded as a valuable incident of her right of privacy ... should not be dis-
carded solely on the basis that her condition prevents her conscious exercise
of the choice."
4 3
The Maryland Attorney General concludes that the refusal or withdrawal
of artificial sustenance is equivalent to the withdrawal of artificial respira-
tion. According to the Attorney General, the Quinlan court analysis, thus,
provides legal support for the ability of a surrogate, with court approval, to
decide to withhold or withdraw AAS from terminally ill and disabled, or
permanently unconscious patients." It should be noted, however, that
39. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
40. See id. at 53-55, 355 A.2d at 670-71.
.41. Id. at 54-55, 355 A.2d at 671.
42. Id. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663.
43. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
44. Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 18. The attorney general states "[e]very appellate
court that has addressed the issue has held that there is no difference as a matter of law be-
tween artificially administered sustenance and other forms of life-sustaining treatment. See
Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 490 (1983); In re
Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 954 (Me. 1987); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 413 n.9, 529 A.2d 434, 444
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Karen Quinlan was not deprived of nutritional sustenance. Rather, the res-
pirator that was theoretically providing her with life-sustaining oxygen was
removed. Arguably the Quinlan analysis does not support the Attorney
General's interpretation because the removal of a machine which, in effect,
"breathes" for the patient is more an exercise of "nature taking its course"
than is the deprivation of an individual's basic nutritional needs.45 Indeed,
the significance of this distinction becomes apparent after further examina-
tion of the Quinlan case. Once the respirator was removed, Ms. Quinlan
continued to survive for nine years without the aid of the respirator.46 The
same certainty would not have been true had she also been deprived of food
and water during this nine year period.
Another problem with allowing a surrogate to make a decision to with-
hold AAS from a disabled patient, terminal or otherwise, is the irreconcila-
ble conflict between such a course of action and the state's interest in
preserving life, including the prevention of suicide. If, as discussed above,
the Attorney General could not provide a sound basis for distinguishing be-
tween a legally assisted suicide and the refusal of AAS by a competent but
terminal patient, there is even less of a legal basis for finding that a surro-
gate's decision on the behalf of another to terminate or refuse AAS is not
legally assisted suicide. Unlike a decision by a competent. terminal patient,
who is able to balance his own personal reasons for deciding to remove or
refuse AAS, the same decision on behalf of an unconscious or mentally in-
competent (and terminally ill) patient necessarily involves active participa-
,tion by at least one other individual. This means that the exercise is no
longer one of self-determination. Rather, it requires the surrogate to substi-
tute his judgment for that of the patient.
Finally, the amount of pain involved in death by dehydration is especially
n.9 (1987); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 380-82, 529 A.2d 419, 427 (1987); In re Conroy, 98 N.J.
321, 372-74, 486 A.2d 1209, 1236 (1985); Delio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 129
A.D. 2d 1, 16-19, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 688-89 (1987); In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 561-63,
747 P.2d 445, 454 (1987); Accord In re Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840
(1988); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1140-42, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 302-03
(1986); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 430-38, 497 N.E.2d 626, 637
(1986).
45. See Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 9 (stating that the permanently unconscious pa-
tient "may stay alive for an indefinite period of time because their basic metabolic functions
continue."). See also Barry, The Ethics of Providing Life-Sustaining Nutrition and Hydration
to Incompetent Patients, 1 J. FAM. & CULTURE 23, 27 (1985) (stating that the withholding of
nutrition and hydration differs from the withholding of medical treatment in that unlike medi-
cal treatment, nutrition and hydration are not used to remedy a clinical condition; rather, they
supply "the means of fulfilling a basic human need and ... support[ ] the body's natural
defenses.").
46. See Note, Removal of a Nutrient Feeding Tube and the Need for a Living Will, 3 J.
CONT. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 253, 253 n.5 (1987).
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pertinent to decisions made on behalf of terminal and disabled patients. The
Attorney General, however, fails to adequately address this issue. In the
case of the terminal and disabled patient, it is the surrogate, and not the
patient, who must determine that the patient would rather die than continue
living in his current condition. Accordingly, before the surrogate may make
a fully informed surrogate decision, he must consider the amount of pain
that the starvation and dehydration will cause to the patient. Although this
issue is disputed within the medical community, one expert has concluded
that, "[d]eath by dehydration is almost always accompanied by very painful
conditions: soreness and burning of the lips, lacrimation, lesions and large
fissures on the lips, ulcerations, crusting, dermatitis on the skin, hard seba-
ceous plugs in the nose, fissures on the tongue and swelling associated with
edema.
4 7
B. Legal Standards Applied to Surrogate Decisionmaking
1. A Surrogate's Decision on Behalf of a Terminal
and Disabled Patient
There are two common law standards-the substituted judgment and the
best interest standards-which delineate the scope and limitations of the sur-
rogate's power and define the decisionmaking process to be exercised by the
surrogate on behalf of a terminal and disabled patient. The Maryland courts
also rely on these standards to determine the validity of the surrogate's deci-
sion. The specifics of these common law standards, as well as the Maryland
statutory scheme, and the requirement of prior court approval are discussed
below.
a. Common Law Standards
Under the common law substituted judgment standard, "if the surrogate
decisionmaker knows enough to judge what the disabled person would de-
cide if he or she were able to, the surrogate should make that choice."4 If
the surrogate is not able to ascertain the patient's treatment philosophies
under the substituted judgment standard, then the surrogate decisionmaker
must base his decision upon the "best interest" standard. Under the "best
interest" standard, the surrogate decisionmaker uses an objective, cost/bene-
fit analysis to determine the course of treatment in terms of the "patient's
47. Barry, supra note 45, at 25; but see Billings, Comfort Measuresfor the Terminally Ill:
Is Dehydration Painful?, 33 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc. 741, 808-10 (1985) (stating that termi-
nally ill patients experience relatively benign symptoms from dehydration which are easily
relieved).
48. Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 25.
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best interest."" 9 In either event, the substituted judgment standard or the
best interest standard must guide every surrogate decision, whether this de-
cision is made by a guardian, family member, or by the court.5" If the sub-
stituted judgment standard is employed, then the surrogate must attempt to
reach the same decision that the patient would have made, based solely upon
the surrogate's evaluation of the person's prior statements or actions which
indicate the patient's beliefs and medical treatment philosophies.5 In con-
ducting this analysis, the surrogate necessarily must exercise a certain degree
of subjectivity in ascertaining the patient's decision. Whenever subjectivity
is involved in a standard, the exercise becomes inexact. When there is no
objective evidence of the patient's medical treatment philosophies upon
which the surrogate can base a treatment decision, then the best interest
standard is more appropriately applied.
When applying the best interest standard, the Attorney General explains
that several factors employed by the President's Commission for the Study
of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical Behavioral Research
should be evaluated. 2 Of these factors, the one which is the most predis-
posed to conflicting interpretation is the "quality and extent of life" as
weighed by a third party on the patient's behalf.53 Quality of life is to be
measured in terms of value to the patient and not the value that others may
find in the continuation of the patient's life.54 Consequently, the surrogate
decisionmaker must consider two questions. First, whether forgoing AAS
will allow the patient to avoid the burden of prolonged dying with accompa-
nying pain and suffering; and second, whether the patient "has the potential
benefit of achieving some satisfaction" if he survives for a longer period.5 5
The definition of "some satisfaction" requires a case-by-case analysis, and
is heavily dependent upon the patient's condition and current physical
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Brophy, 398 Mass. at 427, 497 N.E.2d at 631, holding that the factors used to
determine whether the patient in a "persistent vegetative state" would refuse artificial suste-
nance include:
(1) [the patient's] expressed preferences; (2) ... [the patient's] religious convictions
and their relation to the refusal of treatment; (3) the impact on ... [the patient's]
family; (4) the probability of adverse side effects; and (5) the prognosis both with
and without treatment. The judge also considered present and future incompetency
as an element which... [the patient] would consider in his decision-making process.
52. Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 28 (citing President's Commission Report, supra note
9, at 135). These factors include "the relief of suffering, the preservation or restoration of
functioning and the quality as well as the extent of life sustained." Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. (citing HASTINGS CENTER GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 28).
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state.5 6 For example, one court has based the decision to withhold AAS for
the terminally ill and disabled patient on the surrogate's finding of the pa-
tient's "prior dislike for medication and medical procedures as well as her
dislike for the medical staff.", 57 Additionally, the Attorney General states
that when a patient lacks capacity to make treatment decisions for himself,
then his conduct, such as "forcible resistance to the insertion of a feeding
tube, or continued efforts to remove a tube . . . should be considered in
determining whether the continuation of [AAS] is in the patient's best inter-
est.",5 8 Arguably, all of these factors are subject to various interpretations
and may result in conflicting conclusions by those involved in the decision-
making process depending upon the weight applied by the decisionmaker(s)
to each factor. One may conclude, for example, that attempts to remove a
feeding tube are merely "reflexive" and indicate only that the tube is uncom-
fortable; others may conclude that the removal effort is an indication by the
patient that he wishes to have the sustenance withdrawn.59 Therefore, even
under the "objective" best interest standard, the reliance by the surrogate
upon medical conclusions which are controverted may lead to inconsistent
and potentially devastating results.
b. Statutory Standards and the Need for Court Approval Applicable
to Surrogate Decision Makers
The Maryland Estates and Trust Code6° authorizes the appointment of a
guardian for a disabled person, as previously defined, and empowers the ap-
pointee to make medical treatment decisions for the person's benefit.61
Although the Code does not expressly discuss medical treatment decisions,
the Attorney General concludes that Section 13-708(8) of the Code implic-
itly authorizes the guardian to withhold or withdraw consent to medical
treatment, including AAS.62 Court approval is required, however, before
56. In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 545, 747 P.2d at 457. The Washington Supreme Court
allowed the patient's mother to decide on behalf of her daughter to withhold all life-sustaining
treatment, including nutrition and hydration. Id. Her daughter was suffering from an incur-
able neurological disorder. Id. The court reasoned that the withholding of life-sustaining
medical treatment was proper since the patient was in the end stages of a terminal illness with
no hope of improvement, and she had to be physically restrained by tie-downs to avoid injury
to herself because she was subject to frequent seizure attacks. Id.
57. Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 28 (citing In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 550-52, 747
P.2d at 448).
58. Id. at 28 n.38.
59. See id. at 6-7 (noting that the insertion and maintenance of a feeding tube can be quite
painful).
60. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 13-704 (1973).
61. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 13-708(8) (1988).
62. Id. If this section is read literally, it would not require court approval before the
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the court appointed guardian's withdrawal decision is honored. If a guard-
ian has been appointed by the court, then the guardian's decision takes prior-
ity over decisions by any other surrogate, including decisions made by
physicians or family members.63
Surrogate decisions made by a family member are subject to a different set
of rules and standards than those of a court appointed guardian. Decisions
made by family members on behalf of the patient to continue the administra-
tion of artificial sustenance to the patient are governed by Section 20-107 of
the Maryland Health General's Code.64 Although Section 20-107 discusses
the ability of the surrogate to make decisions concerning the furnishing of
treatment, there is no mention in that section of the ability of the surrogate
to make decisions involving the withholding or withdrawing of medical
treatment. 65 Therefore, the surrogate's decision for withholding or with-
drawing of sustenance must be analyzed under other legally recognized sur-
rogate decisionmaking procedures, including those found under Maryland
common law.
The ability of family members to make a life-sustaining medical decision
on behalf of a terminally ill disabled relative is protected under Maryland
law.6 6 Life-ending decisions made by family members on the disabled pa-
tient's behalf also are valid provided certain procedures are followed. These
procedures, as discussed below, are derived from the need to make expedient
medical treatment decisions when the patient is terminally ill and unable to
make his own medical treatment decisions. Moreover, in many of these
cases no prior documentation expressing the patient's treatment wishes ex-
ists. Therefore, an informal case law parallel to Section 20-107 of the code
has evolved.6 7
Under the common law surrogate decisionmaking rule, if the attending
physician has concluded that life-sustaining treatment should be withheld or
guardian could authorize the withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment. The
code speaks only of the court's "authorizing an affirmative medical treatment." Id. at § 13-
704. The Attorney General, however, interprets the provision to require court approval for
"negative" action decisions as well, such as withholding artificial sustenance. Att'y Gen. Op.,
supra note 2, at 31. The guardian should apply the substituted judgement or best interest
standards in formulating their decision in the case of the permanently unconscious patient. Id.
at 31.
63. Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 4.
64. Id. at 33-34.
65. See MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-107 (1987).
66. See, e.g., id; Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 33 ("[MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN.]
§ 20-107(d) grants decisionmaking authority to family members .... The insertion or
continued use of a feeding tube is the 'furnishing [of] medical ... care and treatment'; hence, it
is within the scope of HG § 20-107 (g) .... ").
67. Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 35.
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withdrawn, and this decision is consistent with proper standards of patient
care, then the physician may recommend this decision to the family.68 If the
entire immediate family agrees with the decision, and the hospital patient
care advisory committee concurs,69 then the statutorily authorized family
member can allow the physician to withhold or withdraw treatment without
court approval.7° Unlike the decision to furnish AAS made under Section
20-107 of the Estates and Trusts Code, if any members of the immediate
family, or the hospital patient care advisory committee objects to withhold-
ing or withdrawing the AAS, then the decision may not stand without court
approval. This is true even if the statutorily selected family member and
decisionmaker contends that withdrawal of AAS from the patient is neces-
sary. If the withdrawal decision is unanimously agreed upon by the immedi-
ate family, the physician is protected from liability for honoring the decision,
provided that the recommendation has been made in accordance with ac-
cepted standards of medical practice.7'
This common law rule appears to directly conflict with the statutory re-
quirement of court approval for withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining
treatment. According to the Maryland Attorney General, however, the
common law rule is reconcilable with the statute because the decision is
made by the terminal and disabled patient's family members, who are usu-
ally in a better position then the courts to make such a decision on behalf of
the patient. Additionally, the Attorney General concludes that the patient is
protected from any potential abuse of the family's decisionmaking power
because if an immediate family member objects to the withdrawal decision,
or there is disagreement with the decision by the hospital or the physician in
charge, then court approval is mandated before the family members may
act.72
A final type of surrogate decisionmaking enables a competent patient to
instruct his physician not to administer artificial sustenance in the event that
68. Id.
69. MD. HEALTH-GEN CODE ANN. § 19-371 (1987) requires each hospital to establish a
patient care advisory committee. See MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 19-373-374 (this
committee must advise the physician(s) and the family members concerning the options for
medical care and treatment of an individual with a life threatening condition.); see also Md.
Health-Gen. Code Ann. § 19-374 (b)(2) ("[a]ny information or document that indicates the
wishes of the patient shall take precedence in the deliberations of the advisory committee.").
70. Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 35, 38 (citing Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 222-23, 741
P.2d at 691, In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 545, 747 P.2d at 456).
71. Id. at 38 n.55. If no family members are available to make a surrogate decision on the
disabled patient's behalf, then court approval is required before the physician may remove or
withhold life-sustaining treatment. id. at 38 n.56 (citing In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 819-
21, 689 P.2d 1372, 1378 (1985)).
72. Id. at 37-38. See Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 222-23, 741 P.2d at 691.
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he becomes disabled. Prior physician instructions appear to be the least reg-
ulated area of surrogate decisionmaking under the current Maryland eutha-
nasia laws.73 In this context, AAS may be withdrawn, with court approval,
if the physician sufficiently establishes that at some prior time, the patient
expressed his desire not to receive such life-sustaining treatment.7 4 No for-
mal documentation or legal instrument is required to corroborate the physi-
cian's statement pertaining to the patient's medical treatment decision. 7,
Moreover, neither the substituted judgment standard, nor the best interest
standard appear to govern the physician's decision. In support of the physi-
cian's power of substitute judgment, the Attorney General stresses that such
direct decisionmaking between doctors and patients should be honored,76
and concludes that the patient is protected because the physician or family
members or guardian must petition the court for approval before AAS is
withheld or withdrawn.
2 A Surrogate's Decision on Behalf of a Permanently
Unconscious Patient
For patients who are not terminally ill, but who are incapable of making
legally competent medical treatment decisions because of permanent uncon-
sciousness, 77 a living will, a medical durable power of attorney, or court
approval is required before AAS is withheld or withdrawn.78  Controversy
within the medical and legal communities surrounds the ability of a surro-
gate to direct the withholding or withdrawing of AAS for a permanently
unconscious patient absent a prior refusal decision by the patient. The more
liberal authority granted under Maryland common law to certain family
members to withhold AAS without court approval in the context of the ter-
minal and disabled patient is not applicable to decisions to withhold or with-
draw treatment made on behalf of the permanently unconscious patient.79
Such decisionmaking requires court approval since, unlike the situation with
terminally ill patients, there is no need for quick decisionmaking. 80
73. See Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 24 ("A person need not execute a formal docu-
ment to make a choice about artificially administered sustenance. Instead, a person who is
competent to make medical decisions at the time of decision about insertion of a feeding tube




77. See President's Commission Report, supra note 9, at 174-75.
78. Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 38.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 39-40.
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As with all surrogate decisionmaking, the substituted judgment or the best
interest standards must guide the surrogate in deciding the medical treat-
ment plans on behalf of the permanently unconscious patient. These pa-
tients, however, pose a different set of problems in the application of the
surrogate best interest standard than do terminal and disabled patients.
Some experts conclude that a permanently unconscious patient does not ex-
perience physical or emotional suffering. 8 If this is true, one cannot justify
the withholding or withdrawing of artificial sustenance from a permanently
unconscious patient upon factors such as the pain and suffering the patient
would experience if his life were prolonged by use of artificial sustenance.
Similarly, the Attorney General holds that a factor which is not normally
considered in the terminally ill patient context must be examined: the inabil-
ity of the patient to experience any of life's satisfactions because of his per-
manently unconscious state.8 2 The Attorney General takes the extreme
view, i.e., that the permanently unconscious patient receives no benefit from
medical treatment, including AAS.83 Experts have concluded, however,
that there is a sufficient benefit to the patient if his death is prevented by
continued treatment.84 The Attorney General has left the ultimate say to
the Maryland General Assembly and to the Maryland courts.85
C. Formal Euthanasic Decisionmaking
1. The Living Will and Medical Durable Power of Attorney
Two different instruments are available to Maryland residents to avoid the
ambiguities and problems involved in surrogate decisionmaking. These in-
struments ensure that the patient's medical treatment philosophies are
respected in the event he becomes disabled, either from illness or permanent
unconsciousness. Under the Maryland Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, a
competent person, who is at least eighteen years of age, may execute a decla-
ration, commonly known as a living will, directing the withholding or with-
drawing of life-sustaining treatment.8 6 To declare the intent to decline
81. Id. at 29.
82. Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 29.
83. Id. at 29. The President's Commission Report emphasizes the tremendous emotional
and financial burden imposed upon the family when treatment to maintain the person in a
permanent state of unconsciousness is continued. President's Commission Report, supra note 9,
at 185.
84. May, Barry, Griese, Grisez, Johnstone, Marzin, McHugh, Meilander, Siegler, Smith,
Feeding and Hydrating the Permanently Unconscious and Other Vulnerable Persons, 3 IssuEs
IN L. & MED. 203, 209 (1987).
85. Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 30.
86. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-602(a) (1987). The common reference to these
laws are the "Living Will" laws. One who forges another's living will declaration, or willfully
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nutrition and hydration, the person must directly specify in the living will
that such treatment be withheld if circumstances warranted it. Therefore, a
broadly worded living will which merely states that the person wishes not to
be kept alive by artificial means is inadequate to allow the withholding of
AAS.8 7 A living will may also be used to express a person's desire to receive
AAS.8 s The treating physician must honor such a declaration, regardless of
the wishes of the family, guardian, or other surrogates.89
Alternatively, the Maryland Estates and Trusts Code allows one to exe-
cute a durable power of attorney to authorize another to act on the grantor's
behalf in the event he becomes disabled. 90 Such authority includes the
power of the grantee to make medical decisions on the grantor's behalf.9'
Although the Code does not expressly state that the durable power of attor-
ney may be used for medical treatment decisionmaking, the Attorney Gen-
eral concludes that the Code provision implicitly allows such a use because it
is not expressly prohibited by the Code.92 Additionally, the Attorney Gen-
eral states that the durable power of attorney is referenced in the Health
Attorney General Articles.93 Therefore, he concludes that the General As-
sembly intended for the medical durable power of attorney to be used as a
type of living will substitute.94
2. Nursing Homes and Powers of Attorney
The Maryland Estate and Trusts Code allows a nursing home to request a
potential or present resident of the nursing home to execute a power of attor-
ney naming the nursing home as his attorney-in-fact.95 This provision pro-
vides the nursing home with an avenue of abuse, because a potential resident
conceals or withholds personal knowledge of a revocation by the patient is guilty of a misde-
meanor and subject to a fine not to exceed $1000. Id. at § 5-614. Note that the punishment for
forging a living will, or committing the other prohibited acts above is a misdemeanor, while the
end result for the victim is fatal.
87. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-602 specifically addresses food and water. The
Attorney General concludes that the act requires a competent patient to specify to the physi-
cian that food and water be withheld before the physician can remove such sustenance.
88. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. at § 5-611 (1987).
89. Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 21.
90. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 13-601 (1974).
91. See Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 23, stating that "although ... [MD. EST. &
TRUSTS CODE ANN.] § 13-601 does not expressly authorize the delegation of health care deci-




95. See MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 19-344(b)(3)(i) (1987). Under this provision,
nursing homes can request, but cannot require prospective residents to execute medical dura-
ble powers of attorney. Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 23.
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may be unduly influenced to sign such an instrument if to do so would in-
crease his chances of admission into a home.96 The Attorney General has
requested that the Maryland General Assembly enact legislation specifically
addressing safeguards to protect nursing home residents.97 Otherwise, as
the Attorney General correctly notes, the potential for abuse is great. For
example, nursing homes in Maryland could begin to make decisions such as
whether a terminally ill resident should continue to receive certain life-sus-
taining treatment purely upon the demand for nursing home space, or the
ability of the patient to pay for such life-sustaining treatment.98 With the
aging of our population, this is a real concern.99 Such decisionmaking would
be based upon the benefit to the nursing home, rather than the benefit to the
patient, and would directly conflict with the common law standards for sur-
rogate decisionmaking (i.e., in the patient's best interest or substituted judg-
ment) that would otherwise apply if there were no direct power of attorney.
Finally, at the other end of the spectrum, the health care provider may
have concerns over its liability in the event it honors an AAS refusal. The
Attorney General opines that any Maryland nursing home or hospital which
honors a sustenance refusal decision is protected from a charge of not pro-
viding adequate health care. While both federal and state law require hospi-
tals and nursing homes to "meet the nutritional needs of their patients," the
Attorney General concludes that these laws do not require the institution to
administer artificial sustenance to the patient.l" ° Accordingly, the Attorney
General explains that a hospital or nursing home honoring the patient's or
the surrogate's request to remove or withhold artificial sustenance would not
96. See generally McCormick, Caring or Starving: The Case of Claire Conroy, 1985
AMERICA 269, 273 stating that:
[N]ursing homes are often afflicted with industry-wide problems that make them a
very troubled and troublesome component of the health care system. And all of this
at the very time when there are economic and social pressures on health care deliv-
ery. Together these factors may make it extremely difficult to keep patients' best
interest at the heart of these [artificial sustenance removal] decisions. In other words,
the potential for abuse is enormous.
97. Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 24, stating "[a]lthough a medical durable power of
attorney is legally effective, no law spells out important safeguards like formalities for its exe-
cution. We recommend that the General Assembly consider legislation specifically addressing
these matters."
98. See McCormick, supra note 96, at 273.
99. See B. SPRING & E. LARSON, EUTHANASIA: SPIRITUAL, MEDICAL, & LEGAL ISSUES
IN TERMINAL HEALTH CARE 22-23 (1987) (from 1950 to 1980 the number of Americans over
the age of sixty-five jumped from 12.4 million to 25.7 million respectively. That group will
grow to a projected 35 million by the year 2000, and may reach upwards to 64 million by the
year 2030.).
100. Att'y Gen. Op., supra note 2, at 45 (citing 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.1125, 482.28 (1987); Code
of Maryland Regulations (COMAR) §§ 10.07.02.13E, 10.07.03.1 la(2) (1987)).
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be in violation of such state and federal regulations.1"'
IV. CONCLUSION
The application of economic factors to medical decisionmaking is a rela-
tively new concept, which has been spurred by the increased cost of ad-
vanced medical procedures, especially those procedures pertaining to life-
saving and life-sustenance. For the terminally ill and permanently uncon-
scious patient, forgoing medical treatment, specifically AAS, equates to for-
going life. Accordingly, granting power to a surrogate to make such a
decision on behalf of the patient requires stringent governance. This is espe-
cially true for the elderly who are living in nursing homes, and who are
potential targets for abusive economic decisionmaking by either the home or
by the family.
This is not to say that economics is irrelevant to life-sustenance decision-
making. A competent person using a living will or durable power of attor-
ney in Maryland may have determined that in the event he becomes disabled
and terminally ill, or permanently unconscious, that the benefit of sustaining
life at that point would be outweighed by the burden upon himself, or the
burdens, including financial, that would be place upon those who would be
responsible for his care. It may be erroneous, however, to impose this same
"financial burden" analysis upon the terminal and incompetent, or perma-
nently unconscious patient who has not made a prior expression as to life-
sustaining treatment. Absent any prior expression by such patients in regard
to the withholding or withdrawing of AAS, granting the surrogate unbridled
power to make "substituted judgments" or decisions that are disguised as
"in the patient's best interest" may lead to abusive economic based medical
treatment decisionmaking. Such a decision violates the common law stan-
dards which are to guide all medical treatment decisions made by surrogates
in Maryland.
Similarly, economic considerations aside, the ability of a surrogate to
make a life-ending decision on behalf of a terminal but disabled, or perma-
nently unconscious patient arguably cannot be based upon the same grounds
as a similar decision by a competent but terminally ill patient. The compe-
tent patient can weigh factors such as burdens upon his family, and the po-
tential pain and suffering he would face if nutrition and hydration were
withheld or withdrawn. Conversely, the ability of a surrogate, even a family
member, to adequately access the desire of the patient who can neither le-
gally speak for himself, nor weigh the burden and pain and suffering factors,
101. Id.
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and who has not made a prior declaration of his medical treatment philoso-
phies, is speculative at best.
In protecting the individual's right to "die with dignity," the Attorney
General may have overlooked the terminally ill and permanently uncon-
scious patient's right to fight for life. One method of equalizing the "imbal-
ance" of rights is to require court approval prior to honoring all surrogate
decisions to end AAS including decisions by family members, even when
there are no objections by the either the hospital or other relatives. Such a
requirement may reduce the use of economics by the surrogate as the deter-
minative factor, while labeling the decision "in the patient's best interest."
Finally, the factors upon which the surrogate bases an AAS withholding or
withdrawing decision need to be clarified by the Maryland Courts and the
Maryland General Assembly. Such clarification is necessary to adequately
protect the patient and to guide the surrogate to ensure that the decision is
one with which all involved can live.
Michael L. Dailey
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